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In this paper we address the question whether insider ownership affects corporate 
performance. Evidence coming from studies dealing with Anglo-Saxon countries is rather 
inconclusive, especially because it seems that results are significantly affected by 
endogeneity. Economically, this is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership 
seems to be mainly driven by management's compensation contracts. We argue that Germany 
is different in this regard, as insider ownership often is related to family control, stock-based 
compensation is less widespread and the market for corporate control is less developed. 
Starting from this presumption our data allows to make an unbiased observation as to whether 
insider ownership affects firm performance. Using a pooled data set of 648 firm observations 
for the years 2003 and 1998 we find evidence for a positive and significant relationship 
between corporate performance – as measured by stock price performance, market-to-book 
ratio and return on assets – and insider ownership. This relationship seems to be rather robust, 
even if we account for endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression approach. Moreover, we 
also find outside block ownership as well as more concentrated insider ownership to have a 
positive impact on corporate performance. Overall the results indicate that ownership 
structure might be an important variable explaining the long term value creation in the 
corporate sector. 
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 1 Introduction
Since the pathbreaking study of Berle and Means (1932), which was the ﬁrst to
put light on the fact that large American corporations were usually not run by
their owners, a whole branch of research evolved investigating into the eﬀects of
the separation of ownership and control. However, the implications of the ﬁndings
of Berle and Means remained almost unnoticed for a long time before Jensen and
Meckling (1976) developed their “theory of the ﬁrm”, a theoretical framework about
the eﬀects of the dispersion of ownership and control. The studies of Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) have been among the ﬁrst to
empirically test the eﬀects of managerial equity ownership (i.e. insider ownership)
on ﬁrm value. Since then several studies have been published on that issue.
Two important results emerge from this branch of literature. First, most of
these studies provide evidence that insider ownership actually aﬀects ﬁrm value,
although the relationship seems not to be monotonic. A positive impact of insider
ownership on ﬁrm value can be explained by the so-called convergence-of-interest
hypothesis, stating that larger equity shares of insiders should be associated with
higher market valuations due to lower agency costs. In contrast, a negative relation
can be explained by the so-called entrenchment hypothesis, predicting that insider
ownership above a certain threshold will have a value destroying eﬀect due to the
upcoming conﬂict between large blockholders (in this case the management) and the
dispersed shareholders. These two hypotheses serve as an explanation for the bell-
shaped relationship between insider ownership and ﬁrm value found by McConnell
and Servaes (1990) or the piecewise-linear relationship discovered by Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988) in their previous study.
However, a serious theoretical objection against the approach used in these
studies has been put forward by Demsetz (1983). He argues that insider ownership
is endogenously determined and, hence, cannot be a determinant of ﬁrm value. His
arguments are supported by the evidence presented in Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
where ﬁrm size, volatility, return on assets and industry aﬃliation are found to
be relevant explanatory variables for the ownership structure of US corporations.
Hence, it may well be that low levels of managerial ownership turn out to be an
optimal incentive arrangement in those ﬁrms whose ﬁrm value tends do be lower
than in other companies, where higher levels of insider ownership are optimal. As
long as one cannot control for the variables being responsible for this relationship, i.e.
there is unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity, the detected correlation between ownership
and ﬁrm performance might just be spurious.
Therefore, more recent studies pay special attention to this problem of endo-
geneity. In fact, the second important result emerging from the pertinent literature
indicates that by using more advanced econometric methods that allow to partially
control for endogeneity it seems that ﬁrm performance is not aﬀected by manage-
rial ownership.1 However, some doubts are left preventing these results from being
accepted as a ﬁnal outcome. Evidently, in a perfect frictionless capital market
competitive forces would make sure that every company puts a value maximizing
ownership structure in place. By deﬁnition, insider ownership would be endogenous
and presumably determined, among other factors, by the company’s performance.
Under such a theoretical perspective the question itself, whether ﬁrm performance
1For a comprehensive overview of these studies see Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, pp. 231-
233).
3depends on the ownership structure, is irrelevant.2
However, pondering the vast corporate governance literature that emerged over
the last decade may challenge this theoretical perspective. Several questions arise
in this context. First of all, do corporate governance regimes really allow market
forces to put value maximizing ownership structures in place? Isn’t it true that
in many countries, including the US, several existing mechanisms allow managers
to shelter themselves from the market for corporate control? And, ﬁnally, isn’t it
true that ownership structure often is rather inert, making a ﬂexible adjustment to
changing market conditions unlikely? From these questions it follows immediately
that more evidence on the ownership-performance relationship is needed, especially
under diﬀerent corporate governance regimes.
This study makes a contribution to the literature exactly under this perspective.
First, as a code law country, Germany has a corporate governance regime that is
very diﬀerent from the regimes governing common law countries. As a stylized
fact, in code law countries investor protection regularly is lower and the market for
corporate control is more hampered.3 This is particulary true for Germany, as Franks
and Mayer (1990) or Wenger and Kaserer (1998a) have pointed out. Therefore, it
might well be that ownership structure does not ﬂexibly adapt to pressures coming
from investors searching for value gains. This inertia in the ownership structure
is enhanced by the fact that blockholdings have been of particular importance in
Germany. These blockholdings were due to the presence of a large number of
family-controlled companies and to a dense network of corporate cross-holdings.4
It is interesting in this regard to note that according to a recently evolving branch
of literature, which pays particular attention to a special case of insider ownership
by looking at the impact of family ownership on ﬁrm performance, new evidence
has been found corroborating the presumption that ownership structure matters to
performance. From this it follows that the performance-ownership relationship in
Germany might be less aﬀected by endogeneity, as this is the case with data from
Anglo-Saxon markets. In fact, our ﬁndings are in accordance with this presumption.
The second contribution of this paper is more technical, but nevertheless inter-
esting. Almost all papers investigating the relationship between ownership structure
and ﬁrm performance aim to measure the latter by Tobin’s Q, i.e. by putting the
market value of a company in relation to the replacement value of its assets. In
practice, however, Tobin’s Q is approximated by a ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio. Ev-
idently, there might be some reservations as to whether the market-to-book ratio
can really be taken as a proxy for ﬁrm value, especially in a Continental-European
accounting context, where historical cost accounting is still important. Therefore,
we use a broader approach by measuring corporate performance not only be the
markte-to-book-ratio, but also by a long-run buy-and-hold stock return as well as
by the return on assets. As we get rather robust results, our ﬁndings are less prone to
methodological objections against the why how corporate performance is measured.
Our results indicate that there is a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between
insider ownership and ﬁrm performance as measured by stock price performance
2See Stigler and Friedland (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
3Cf., among others, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998).
4For a detailed description of this network as of 1996 cf. Wenger and Kaserer (1998b,
pp. 51-61); There is some indication that the density of this network has been reduced over
the last 4 years. Cf. H¨ opner and Krempel (2005, pp. 10-11).
4over a ﬁve year period. The results by using market-to-book ratio or return on as-
sets as performance measures conﬁrm the ﬁndings. In order to account for possible
endogeneity we employ an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression
approach. It turns out that results seem not to be driven by endogeneity. More-
over, we also ﬁnd outside block ownership as well as more concentrated insider
ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Hence, the paper
corroborates the assertion that ownership may have an autonomous inﬂuence on
ﬁrm performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief literature
review. Section 3 explains the research design as well as the data set, while section
4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
As has been mentioned, the ﬁrst studies investigating into the relationship between
insider ownership, as measured by top-managements’ shareholdings, and ﬁrm value
have been those of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes
(1990). Both papers found a signiﬁcant, non-monotonic relationship. The most
important theoretical objection against the approach used in these studies has been
put forward by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Basically, they ar-
gue that in a competitive capital market environment market forces will make sure
that every company chooses its value maximizing ownership structure. Hence, in-
side ownership is an endogenously determined variable and any observed correlation
of ownership and ﬁrm value is, basically, meaningless. In fact, the relationship of
inside ownership with ﬁrm value might be due to some ﬁrm characteristics that are
unobservable for the econometrician. As a consequence, an endogeneity problem
arises, because ownership structure and ﬁrm value are determined simultaneously.
In fact, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that ownership structure of US companies
is plausibly determined by ﬁrm size, stock price volatility, industry aﬃliation, and
some other variables. According to their view this corroborates the understanding
that ownership structure is endogenously determined. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia (1999) extend Demsetz and Lehns’ results by using a ﬁxed eﬀects panel data
model and instrumental variables to control for possible unobserved ﬁrm hetero-
geneity. They conclude that most variation in managerial ownership is explained
by unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity and that managerial ownership does not aﬀect
ﬁrm performance to an econometrically observable extent. Research presented by
Loderer and Martin (1997) points in the same direction. They construct a simulta-
neous equation system for a set of companies involved in acquisitions which handles
performance and insider ownership as endogenous variables. As a result, insider
ownership does not have a predictive eﬀect on performance in their model, but
the other way round performance has a negative eﬀect on insider ownership. Cho
(1998), after being able to replicate the results of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, builds
a simultaneous equation system consisting of three equations where insider owner-
ship, performance and investment are treated as endogenous variables. Similarly to
Loderer and Martin performance seems to inﬂuence ownership but not vice versa.
An integrated approach, where insider ownership is treated as only one of seven
corporate governance mechanisms, is taken by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who
present evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample
5of US ﬁrms. The positive eﬀect of insider ownership on ﬁrm performance, which
was found if each mechanism was examined separately, disappears in the integrated
model, broadly supporting Demsetz’ theory of the optimal use of control mecha-
nisms. A similar procedure is later taken by Bhagat and Jeﬀeris (2002). They are
able to ﬁnd evidence for their hypothesis that takeover defenses, takeovers, manage-
ment turnover, corporate performance, capital structure, and ownership structure
are interrelated and, thus, should be examined in a system of simultaneous equa-
tions. However, they admit that “such a system of equations is nontrivial” and
even looks less feasible for studies about non US markets, where data availability
and quality often is a serious problem. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann
(2005), following the methodology of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), model a simul-
taneous equation system which deﬁnes block ownership, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc corporate
governance index, board size, outside representation of the board, and leverage as
relevant corporate governance mechanisms besides insider ownership. Using a sam-
ple of 109 Swiss listed companies they ﬁnd evidence for the widespread hypothesis
of a positive relationship between corporate governance and performance.
Recently, a new branch in the literature has evolved which looks into the eﬀects
of family-control. Evidently, family ownership has to be seen mostly as a special case
of insider ownership and therefore this new family business literature is quite relevant
for the insider ownership issue as well. This is even more true for Germany, where
family businesses traditionally attracted a lot of attention given their predominate
economic role. For the US, recently Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that family
ownership is present in a third of all S&P 500 companies and that family ﬁrms
outperform non-family ﬁrms, thus suggesting that family ownership is an eﬀective
organizational structure. Villalonga and Amit (2005), looking at all Fortune 500
companies during 1994-2000, come to the conclusion that family ownership creates
value for the case that the founder serves as CEO or as chairman of the family
ﬁrm. We argue that family ownership is stickier than equity ownership of hired
managers. Therefore, as it is quite unrealistic to assume that this type of ownership
adjusts continuously to changing market conditions, it may be improbable that
family ownership is endogenously determined, except in the very long run. Actually,
these results are at least challenging from a perspective, where insider ownership
and corporate value are simultaneously determined.5
While previous results are predominantly derived from US data, also some in-
ternational evidence exists. For the UK, Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) ﬁnd
that the insider ownership to corporate value relationship is co-deterministic giving
further evidence to the work of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia or Cho. For Japan,
Chen, Guo, and Mande (2003) are able to ﬁnd a positiv relation between insider
ownership and ﬁrm performance, if they control for ﬁxed eﬀects. Their results
are stable to the treatment of insider ownership and Tobin’s Q (as a measure of
ﬁrm performance) as endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system. For
Switzerland, Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) also ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
cantly positive eﬀect of managerial ownership on ﬁrm valuation. Their ﬁndings also
remain stable, if insider ownership is integrated in a simultaneous equation system,
thus suggesting that the inﬂuence of insider ownership on performance does actually
exist.
Given the fact that results coming from code law countries tend to be in conﬂict
5Further studies about family ﬁrms are e.g. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, and Mishra
(1998), Chami (1999) or Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003).
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structure and corporate performance might be inﬂuenced by the corporate gov-
ernance regime. Therefore, it is very interesting that some studies dealing with
German family ﬁrms corroborate the view that ownership matters for ﬁrm value.
For instance, by looking at the long run performance (1903-2003) of a matching
sample of 62 family and 62 non-family ﬁrms, Ehrhardt, Nowak, and Weber (2004)
show that family businesses outperform non-family ﬁrms in operating performance,
but not with respect to stock price performance. In an earlier study of 105 IPOs
of German family-owned ﬁrms Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) found that the long run
abnormal performance of family ﬁrms was aﬀected by the family ownership pat-
tern during a three year post-IPO period. Bott (2002), who analyzes the eﬀects
of announcements of changes in shareholder structures with regard to shareholder
concentration and shareholder identity, does not ﬁnd convincing evidence that stock
market reactions to those announcements depend on the identity of the sharehold-
ers.
Besides founding family ownership, the concentration of share ownership has
attracted some German research recently. For example, Edwards and Weichenrieder
(2004) show that for most types of large shareholders the beneﬁts of concentrated
ownership through greater monitoring of management and reduced agency conﬂicts
equal or sometimes even signiﬁcantly outweigh the harmful eﬀects of concentration,
e.g. private beneﬁts through exploitation of minority shareholders. Hereby, they es-
pecially distinguish between control rights and cash ﬂow rights, which usually diﬀer
when non-voting share classes exist. While looking at control rights seems appro-
priate for the examination of monitoring eﬀects, cash ﬂow rights seem to be the
right measure for the investigation of alignment of interest eﬀects. Hence, we deﬁne
share ownership as the portion of cash ﬂow rights throughout this study, because in-
tuitively the monitoring eﬀect of block ownership cannot be assumed to be present
in the case of managerial ownership. The results of Edwards and Weichenrieder
are in line with prior ﬁndings of Edwards and Nibler (2000) who concluded that
ownership concentration is a more important factor in the German corporate gover-
nance system than banks, which originally were thought to posses a dominating role.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodolody
In this study, we use two cross-sections and a pooled sample of German listed
companies to examine current shareholder structures and the phenomenon of insider
ownership. Though being aware of the problems arising from the use of primarily
cross-sectional data, we decided to use them because of the following reasons: First,
since insider ownership in Germany experienced little attraction in research until now,
we thought that it is still necessary to better understand shareholder structures at
large and to learn more about the appropriate measurement of insider ownership
before going into a deeper analysis. Second, since the historical availability of
shareholder structure data in Germany is rather limited, the construction of a large
and comprehensive panel data set faces an enormous eﬀort. Furthermore, it is
not clear if such an eﬀort would be rewarded, because poor data quality might
pose natural limits to the examination of low frequency (e.g. yearly) shareholder
7structure data. Third, as we will show in section 4 inside ownership tends to be
rather sticky, limiting the insights from a panel data analysis.
We will address our research question in a three step analysis. In a ﬁrst step,
explicit attention is paid to the descriptive statistics. This is done in section 3.4,
where a comparison with prior ﬁndings for the German market is presented. In a
second step, section 4 presents the results of an OLS-regression estimation in order
to gain a more extensive understanding about the eﬀectiveness of insider ownership
as a corporate governance mechanism. Finally, we build a simultaneous equation
system to treat insider ownership and performance as endogenous variables. In this
way we should be able to control for endogeneity in our data set.
3.2 Sample Selection
The universe for the cross sectional samples comprises all companies, which were
member of the CDAX, the broadest index representing the German equity market,
at the end of 2003 or 1998, respectively. Furthermore, the companies must have
been listed in the CDAX for at least one of the two ﬁve year periods ranging from
1998 to 2003 and 1993 to 1998.6 The way in which the ﬁnal samples were derived
is shown in table 1.
Insert table 1
In 2003 (1998), from a total of 719 (520) share classes 652 (380) ﬁrms have been
left in the data set after excluding dual share classes and ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Then, 362
(22) companies which were not CDAX members during the whole required ﬁve year
period dropped the sample, leaving us with a total of 290 (358) companies.7 Be-
cause of ﬁrms with missing data, the number of complete data sets varies between
235-247 for the 2003 sub-sample and 212-220 for the 1998 sub-sample. Conse-
quently, our sample captures approximately 37% (57%) of all non-ﬁnancial CDAX
companies as of 31.12.2003 (31.12.1998).
3.3 Deﬁnition of Variables
The ownership structure variables constitute a key element in this analysis and,
hence, deserves additional attention. The shareholder structures have been taken
from the 2004-I and 1999-I editions of Hoppenstedt Aktienf¨ uhrer.8 Identiﬁed share-
6The condition that companies must have been CDAX members for the ﬁve years preced-
ing the cut-oﬀ dates (31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998) is introduced because we decided to track
performance over this 60 months period.
7Most of the 362 ﬁrms dropped from the 2003 sub-sample had their IPO after the cut-oﬀ
date 31.12.1998 and hence were not listed for the ﬁve year period. Therefore, especially ﬁrms
which went public during the “heyday of the new economy” were excluded from our analysis.
As a consequence, our analysis refers more to the “traditional” market. Out of the 362 ﬁrms,
only 86 were either acquired by another listed companies or delisted after a squeeze-out. We
are aware of the fact that this criterion may induce a sample selection bias into our analysis.
However, since only few of these companies actually went bankrupt and we did not ﬁnd any
signs of systematic diﬀerences of these ﬁrms compared to the sample ﬁrms, we think that the
potential bias is manageable from an econometric point of view.
8For a presentation and discussion of ownership disclosure requirements in Germany cf.
Becht and B¨ ohmer (2003).
8holders have been classiﬁed manually according to a proprietary scheme which is
further described in table 2.
Insert table 2
In line with common research all members of both boards, i.e. the management
board (“Vorstand”) and the supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”), as well as their
families are deﬁned as being insiders (coded as MB and SB). For the case of the
supervisory board, only stakes owned by individuals are taken into account while
stakes of e.g. corporates, which also might send representatives to the supervisory
board, are not classiﬁed as insider stakes.9 In addition, we also identify a third group
of “quasi-insiders”, in which we classiﬁed all former members of the boards and their
families (FBM). For this reason the insider deﬁnition used in this study deviates
from that normally used in the literature. Nevertheless, this may be reasonable as
in this way we account for a peculiarity of German companies, where former board
members with large ownership stakes often exert considerable inﬂuence on “their‘”
former companies without being oﬃcially in charge. Because we have no a priori
reason to believe that one measure of insider ownership dominates another we will
test these single measures individually as well as in combination, where total insider
ownership is deﬁned as the total equity stake controlled altogether by the three
insider groups (MB SB FBM).10
Besides insiders, we deﬁne corporates, investment companies, banks, institu-
tional investors, insurance companies, government, outside individuals, treasury
shares (of course not a real owner type), employees, and others as relevant out-
side ownership groups. As a result, for each company an ownership structure by
owner type becomes available, where the individual variables express the percentage
share owned by the respective groups. As mentioned in section 2, we decided to
use cash ﬂow instead of control rights for measuring ownership.11 Alongside own-
ership type variables also two ownership concentration variables, BLOCK O and
BLOCK NO, are computed, indicating the cumulative share owned by all outside
blockholders owning at least 5% and the number of these outside blockholders, re-
spectively. These variables are introduced because there is a widespread belief that
block ownership constitutes an eﬀective monitoring mechanism. Consequently, an
interdependency between insider ownership and block ownership is probable.
An overview of all variables used in this study and their descriptions is given
in table 3. Firm performance is measured as buy-and-hold total stock returns over
a period of 60 months (BAHR) as well as on the basis of market-to-book ratios
(MTBV) and return on assets (ROA). Hence, for the 2003 (1998) cross section
sample BAHRs are measured during the 60 months period from December 1998
(1993) to December 2003 (1998).12 The ratio of market value of equity to the
book value of equity is essentially the same as Tobin’s Q.13 MTBVs are measured
9For a discussion of “agents watching agents” see Woidtke (2002).
10We measure ownership at the ultimate level. Hence, stakes of insiders held through a
interim holding company will be classiﬁed as MB SB FBM at the ultimate level. Cf. K¨ oke
(1999); Becht and B¨ ohmer (2003).
11Meanwhile control rights are measured by the share of voting shares (usually ordinary
shares), cash ﬂow rights refer to the weighted portion of both voting and non-voting shares
(usually preferred shares).
12Six values above 500% (4 in 1998 and 2 in 2003) were treated as outliers since the stan-
dardized residuals were above/below +/- 3 std. dev. in the regression analysis. Since four
of the six cases showed MB SB FBM share over 40% (average: 35.2%) a bias in account of a
positive relationship between insider ownership and performance might be introduced if any.
13See Gorton and Schmid (2000, p. 44).
9at the end of the respective year and are computed as the sum of the market values
of all share classes divided by the book value of equity capital and reserves. The
market value of equity, i.e. the nominator of the fraction, by deﬁnition cannot
become negative, while the book value of equity, i.e. the denominator, can do so.
In those cases the MTBV can not be interpreted. Similarly, the MTBV becomes
very large, if the denominator approaches zero even though the nominator might be
very small. Hence, negative, zero and MTBVs above 15 were excluded from further
analysis.14 Finally, the return on assets (ROA) constitutes an accounting measure of
the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. Since the latter two performance measures are subject
to accounting distortions, which are especially important in a Continental-European
accounting context, where historical cost accounting has long been prevalent,15 we
put more emphasis on the results where ﬁrm performance is measured on the basis
of stock price returns.
It should be noted that our approach (focusing on stock returns), in a certain
sense, is more conservative than the ﬁrm value approach (focusing on Tobin’s Q)
used in the US literature. To see this, assume that for whatever reason there is a
positive relationship between insider ownership and ﬁrm performance. If the market
is completely aware of this relationship, stock prices would react accordingly right
at the moment when the ownership structure becomes public or changes. Hence, as
long as there is no change in the ownership structure no under- or outperformance
would be observable, even though insider controlled companies would be econom-
ically more successful. Under these conditions our approach would not be able to
detect any relation between insider ownership and ﬁrm performance. However, if the
market does not fully reﬂect the beneﬁts of insider control right from the beginning,
stock price returns would convey partial information about the market’s assessment
of the beneﬁts of insider ownership. It seems plausible that the market is aﬀected by
such learning eﬀects, especially if longer periods are taken into consideration. This
is even more true as theory makes no clear prediction with respect to the impact
of ownership on performance.16 However, the longer the period of observation the
more likely it is that even a rather sticky ownership variable is subject to changes
and, hence, the stock price movement would be aﬀected by such changes. For that
reason we chose an observation period of 5 years, being suﬃciently long in order to
account for the market’s learning eﬀects, but suﬃciently short not to be too much
aﬀected by changes in the insider ownership structure.17 Moreover, by using two
totally diﬀerent 5 year periods it is implausible that results will be aﬀected by some
kind of a ﬁxed time eﬀect. All market data and accounting information are drawn
from the Datastream database.
Insert table 3
Besides ownership and performance variables a number of control variables are
introduced. The level of outside blockholdings (BLOCK O), i.e. the cumulated
shareholdings of all outsiders which individually hold at leat 5%, is used to account
for possible substitutional eﬀects between insider ownership, as an instrument to
14Excluded negative/zero MTBVs: 7 (1998) and 14 (2003). Excluded MTBVs above 15:
17 (1998) and 3 (2003); cf. Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004, p. 17).
15Cf. Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004, p. 152).
16For a similar argument cf. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); they label this approach
as a kind of a long-run event study.
17A similar approach has been used in some recent corporate governance studies, e.g. Dro-
betz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004).
10align shareholders’ and management’s interest, and outside block ownership, as an
instrument for eﬀective monitoring. In addition, the number of outside blockholders
(BLOCK NO) takes into account that the potential for eﬀective monitoring might
decrease if the control rights are split up among an increasing number of outside
parties. Firm Size (LN ASSETS), measured by the natural logarithm of total assets,
is included to account for the fact that insider ownership in very large corporations is
less widespread.18 Firm risk (FIRM RISK) measures the unsystematic, diversiﬁable
portion of companies’ total risk. It is measured as the residuals’ sum of squares
(SSE) from a regression of the individual stock returns on the returns of the market
(CDAX) over the preceding 60 months. The ﬁnancial structure (DEBT RATIO),
measured as total debt to ﬁrm value (total debt + market value of equity), reﬂects
the disciplining eﬀect of higher interest burdens on managements behavior.19 The
growth potential (SALES G), which is expected to be captured in the market valua-
tion of equity, is proxied by the average annual sales growth over the past three years.
We include it in our analysis to diﬀerentiate higher market valuations arising from
higher growth potential from those that might be the result of lower agency costs
due to the alignment of interest among management and other shareholders. The
dummy variable dividends (DIV) indicates whether dividends have been paid during
the respective year.20 In the pooled sample, the year dummy variable (YEAR 1998)
is included to account for diﬀerences between the two sub-sample periods. Industry
dummy variables are used (but not presented in the results) to account for hetero-
geneity among eight diﬀerent industries.21 Later on in the analysis, the number of
management board members (MB NO), a dummy variable indicating the presence
of voting restrictions (VOTE), a dummy variable indicating whether the supervisory
board of a company is subject to co-determination (CODET) and the ratio of intan-
gible to total assets (INT ASSETS) are introduced as further independent variables.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
According to the data the mean ownership stake of insiders (MB SB FBM), as
measured by cash ﬂow rights, in 2003 adds up to 29.0%; it is interesting to see
that this ﬁgure is quite close to the 29.6% of insider ownership recorded for 1998.
The same is true for outside blockownership which is equal to 32.0% resp. 32.6%.
As can be seen from the descriptive statistics in Panel A of table 4 incumbent
executive board members (MB) control on average 10.7% of their ﬁrm’s shares,
while incumbent supervisory board members (SB) control 9.9% on average. The
equity stake of former board members (FBM) averages 8.5%. As a further result
it should be emphasized that outside blockholders altogether control 32.0% on
average. Finally, table 4 gives summary information about all the other variables
18See Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 195).
19See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 221).
20Cf. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005, p. 21); Edwards and Weichenrieder
(2004, pp. 155-156).
21Our industry classiﬁcation diﬀers from the current scheme used by Deutsche B¨ orse AG
which classiﬁes Prime Standard companies into 18 diﬀerent industries, since the new classi-
ﬁcation scheme diﬀers from the one in place at the end of 1998. Furthermore, we reduced
the number of industry categories in place as of end 1998 by grouping from 15 to 8 non-
ﬁnancial categories in order to increase the number of cases in each category: automobile,
chemicals, construction, consumers, electronics, food & beverages, industrial and utilities &
transportation.
11used in this study.
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As can be seen from table 5 there are no remarkable diﬀerences among six
of the eight industry categories. However, the insider ownership pattern in the
food&beverages- as well as in the utilities-industry is quite diﬀerent from other in-
dustries. In fact, the former has an unusual high mean insider ownership share of
59.2%, while in the latter the opposite is true with an insider share of 4.8%. Presum-
ably, this result is driven by a size eﬀect and small group sizes of the food&beverages
(n=13) and utilities industry (n=20). Moreover, it should be noted that utilities
in Germany in many cases are formerly state owned companies. Anyhow, it can be
stated that insider ownership is a widespread phenomenon in listed German compa-
nies.
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As has already been emphasized, there is only a very small number of stud-
ies analyzing the ownership structure of German companies. For instance, Bott
(2002, pp. 279-280) reports that as measured by the number of directly held share
blocks, as registered with authorities (“Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Finanzdienstleistungsauf-
sicht (BaFin)”) at the end of 1999, individuals represent the most important share-
holder group in as much as they account for 33.1% of all registered share blocks.
Franks and Mayer (2001, p. 947), investigating a sample of 171 German ﬁrms in
1990, ﬁnd that family groups are the second most important owner group behind
other corporates. The diﬀerence to our results, which are reported in table 6 and
where corporates rank only second after insiders, could be explained by the fact that
in 1990 disclosure of ownership stakes was only mandatory at the excess of con-
trol thresholds beyond 25%. Since in our sample the distribution of the ownership
stakes of corporates is even more skewed than for individual insiders,22 the changes
in disclosure rules and the increasing transparency of ownership structures over the
last decade revealed most notably also smaller ownership stakes.23 This may be the
reason why insider ownership has become more visible over the last years. The same
eﬀect may explain the relatively low mean ownership stake for individuals of 10.8%,
which was found by K¨ oke (1999, p. 16) for listed corporations over the period 1994
to 1998.
The 2003 mean insider ownership stake of 29.0% in our sample is relatively
large compared with ﬁndings from other countries. For instance, Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988, p. 297) ﬁnd a mean combined stake of all board members of
10.6% for listed US ﬁrms, which is close to the 12.1% which were found by Cho
(1998, p. 107). According to Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005, p. 651) the mean
ownership stake held by the management of UK ﬁrms is 13.0%, while the same ﬁgure
is equal to 17.3% for Switzerland, according to Schmid (2003, p. 39). Although
the insider ownership deﬁnition used in these studies is slightly diﬀerent from the
deﬁnition used in this paper, as we include former board members, it is nevertheless
safe to say that insider ownership plays a more important role in Germany than in
other countries.24 Moreover, the peculiarity of the shareholder structure in Germany
22For corporates the mean equity stake is 19.4%, while the median is 0.0%. For insiders,
the mean and median are equal to 29.0% and 21.1%, respectively.
23See footnote 6.
24This can also be seen from the fact that in our sample equity stakes of board members
alone sum up to an average of 20.6% for 2003 and 22.5% for 1998.
12becomes even more pronounced, if all blockholdings by current or former board
members as well as by other external individuals, companies or the government are
summed up. In that case it turns out that the mean freeﬂoat in a German listed
company is only 36.0% as of the year 2003.25 Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005,
p. 651) report that for the average UK ﬁrm the sum of management shareholdings
plus external blockholdings is equal to 50.3%; from that one can conclude that the
average freeﬂoat should be equal to 49.7%.26 For the US according to McConnell
and Servaes (1990, p. 600) the sum of insider holdings and external blockholdings
equals 37.4%. Hence, it is still true that dispersed ownership is less important in
Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Insert table 6
From these ﬁgures it seems that dispersed ownership is unexpectedly low, even in
the US or UK. However, it should be noted that these ﬁgures are unweighted means
and, hence, systematic diﬀerences in small and large companies are not taken into
account. In fact, the picture becomes substantially diﬀerent, if market-cap-weighted
means are calculated, as has been done in the second column of table 6. In that
case the average insider ownership stake is equal to 11.3% and the average freeﬂoat
increases up to 46.7%. Evidently, managerial ownership is the more relevant the
smaller the market capitalization of a company. Although a comparable ﬁgure is,
to our knowledge, not available for the US or UK, it can be safely assumed that the
market-cap-weighted mean freeﬂoat would be substantially higher than the 49.7%
reported above. In fact, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 362) ﬁnd an
average total managerial ownership stake of 13,4% for companies whose sales exceed
$ 188 million while smaller companies show signiﬁcantly higher insider ownership
stakes between 25,4% ($ 22 million ≤ sales ≤ $ 188 million) and 32,0% (sales ≤
$ 22 million). Although these results do not include external blockholdings, it can
be expected that even for such external stakes a clear size-eﬀect exists.
A more precise picture of the size-eﬀect can be gathered from table 7 where
sample companies are grouped according to their insider ownership share. As in-
dicated, the distribution of the insider ownership variable MB SB FBM is heavily
positively skewed and in 44.1% of the companies the insiders own less than 10% of
the company’s cash ﬂow rights.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 A ﬁrst look at ownership and performance
We start with a simple two-sample t-test in order to gather some basic information
about the relationship between insider ownership and performance. For that purpose
the 2003 sub-sample is split into two equally-sized sub-samples using the insider
ownership as discriminating variable. As reported in table 8, the mean aggregated
25Please note that according to panel A of table 4 the average blockholding, i.e. the sum of
all external equity stakes individually larger than 5%, is 32.0%. Together with insider equity
holdings of 29.0% this adds up to a closely-held equity stake of 61.0% on average. Again, this
ﬁgure is very close to the corresponding ﬁgure for the year 1998 given in panel B of table 4,
which reveals a closely-held equity stake of 62.2%.
26Similar ﬁgures for the UK are reported by Faccio and Lasfer (1999).
13insider ownership stake (MB SB FBM) in the low insider ownership group amounts
to 1.7%, while it adds up to 55.9% in the high insider ownership group. We ﬁnd
that the sub-sample with higher insider ownership exhibits lower mean buy-and-
hold returns (-12.1% vs. -2.2%), similar market to book values (2.0 vs. 2.0) and
higher average return on assets (3.2% vs. 2.3%). However, these diﬀerences are
not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the tests for diﬀerences in means, shown in table 8,
highlight other interesting variations in ﬁrm characteristics.
Insert table 8
For example, low insider ownership companies have signiﬁcant higher ownership
share held by outside blockholders (56.9%) than high insider ownership companies
(7.2%). This underlines the widespread existence of outside blockholdings and is
in line with the evidence found by Becht and B¨ ohmer (2003, p. 8) that 82.3% of
listed German ﬁrms have a minority blockholders who controls more than 25%;
64.7% of listed ﬁrms are even majority controlled by blockholders. Thus, it seems
that outside block ownership might be a substitute to insider ownership and, hence,
both ownership phenomenons have to be taken into account in the analysis. This
assumption is further supported by the signiﬁcant negative correlation between out-
side blockholdings and insider ownership, as reported in table 9.27 Furthermore,
as shown in table 8 signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be found for the number of out-
side blockholders, ﬁrm size, the number of management board members, and the
two dummy variables relating to the existence of any kind of deviations from the
one-share-one-vote principle and the presence of codetermination.
Insert table 9
Examining the correlation matrix we observe that the correlations between the
insider ownership variable and the three performance variables are diﬀerent in signs,
albeit insigniﬁcant. Moreover, table 9 gives no strong indication that results might
be aﬀected by a multicollinearity problem. In the next sections the insider ownership-
performance relationship will be analyzed in a multivariate regression framework.
4.2 Base case: OLS regression results
For the 2003 sub-sample OLS regression results are presented in table 10, where
models 1 and 2 use stock returns (BAHR) as dependent variable, whereas models
3 to 6 use market-to-book ratios (MTBV) and return on assets (ROA). Since we
felt the need to learn more about the appropriate measure for insider ownership in
Germany, we carried out the regression analysis using the three insider ownership
variables as separate regressors (i.e. MB, SB, and FBM) in models 1, 3 and 5 as well
as the aggregated insider ownership variable (i.e. MB SB FBM) in models 2, 4 and
6. We had complete data sets for only between 235 to 247 companies depending
on the choice of the respective performance measure. In contrast to the univariate
analysis in section 4.1, in the multivariate analyses the signs of all but one (the
exception is FBM in model 5) insider ownership coeﬃcients in models 1 to 6 are
27This result should be viewed with caution since insider ownership and block ownership
are partial substitutes and, not surprisingly, are highly negatively correlated. However, as
more than these two shareholder groups exist, both shares must not add up to 100% and,
hence, observed correlations are not totally trivial.
14positive, indicating a positive impact of insider ownership on ﬁrm performance. For
the stock return models 1 and 2 all insider ownership coeﬃcients turn out to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at least on the 0.05 level. For the MTBV models 3
and 4 three of the four coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least on the 0.1 level and for the
ROA models 5 and 6 only supervisory board ownership is signiﬁcant (0.01 level).
This yields a ﬁrst, rather consistent indication that there might be an economic
rationale for ﬁrm performance to be inﬂuenced by insider ownership.
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With regard to the explanatory power of the models it should be noted that
the adjusted R2 is equal to 36%, if stock returns are used as dependent variable,
and around 18%, if MTBV or ROA are used. This is in line with the view that
accounting performance measures might be rather noisy for German companies.28
Thus, we will use model 2 (aggregated insider ownership and BAHR as dependent
variable) as the base case, which will be discussed in more detail. The insider own-
ership coeﬃcient of 82.6 — signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level — states that on average
an increase in insider ownership by 100 basis points results in an increase of the
ﬁve year stock price performance of 83 basis points. Among the control variables,
ﬁrm size, ﬁrm risk, growth potential and dividend payments have a positive eﬀect
on stock returns, while high levels of debt turn out to have a negative impact.
While the positive eﬀects of sales growth and dividend payments may be intuitively
plausible, the remaining eﬀects deserve further discussion. One possible explanation
for the negative eﬀect of high debt levels might be that small and highly leveraged
ﬁrms experienced more serious devaluations in their stock prices during the market
downturn from 2001 to 2003. On the other hand, the positive sign of the coeﬃ-
cient of ﬁrm risk could signify that those ﬁrms which managed to recover from their
drops in market values of equity showed higher return variations than those which
did not. Finally, the results strongly support the presumption that board ownership
and outside blockholdings are a substitute to each other. In fact, according to
model 2 in table 10 the marginal rate of substitution is equal to 82.6/93.9=0.88.
Hence, a change in insider ownership by 100 basis points must be accompanied by
an oﬀsetting change of 88 basis points in external blockholdings in order not to
have any impact on ﬁrm performance. In a very strict sense it follows from this
that external blockholdings are more eﬀective in terms of value creation. However,
given the variance in the data one should not stress this result. As a corollary, it
is interesting to note that the coeﬃcient on the number of blockholders variable is
signiﬁcantly (0.01 level) negative. This is in line with the view that the beneﬁts of
outside control decrease the more dispersed blockholdings are.
4.3 Variations to the base case
After assuming a pure linear speciﬁcation of the impact of insider ownership on
performance in the previous section, we now investigate the possibility of alterna-
tive speciﬁcations. We search for the curvilinear relationship found by McConnell
and Servaes (1990) by including the squared term of board member ownership, la-
beled as MB SB FBM SQ in model 7 of table 11. As a result, the coeﬃcient for
MB SB FBM becomes negative but not on a signiﬁcant level. The coeﬃcient of the
28Cf. in this regard also Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004, p. 152).
15squared term (MB SB FBM SQ) is positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Thus,
we fail to ﬁnd the bell-shape relationship found by McConnell and Servaes where
insider ownership above a certain threshold becomes value destroying.29 This is
quite interesting, as the result is not in accordance with the view that large insider
stakes are harmful to outside shareholders because of their expropriation via the
consumption of private beneﬁts by insiders.30
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We also checked whether it would be possible to replicate the piecewise-linear re-
lationship found by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) or Cho (1998). Dividing the
insider ownership variable in three subvariables — one for low (MB SB FBM 0to5),
medium (MB SB FBM 5to25) and high (MB SB FBM 25to100) insider ownership
stakes — using the thresholds of 5% and 25% as proposed by Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, only the coeﬃcient for insider ownership above 25% turned out to be sig-
niﬁcant (0.01 level). This can be seen from the results of model 8 in table 11. Even
by looking at several diﬀerent combinations of the thresholds we have not been able
to improve the results. Hence, the linear relationship between insider ownership and
ﬁrm performance, as used in model 2, seems to represent still the most convincing
speciﬁcation.
Suggestions to alter the insider ownership variable to reﬂect the concentration
of insider ownership or the dollar value of the ownership share were implemented
in models 9 to 11. In model 9, the coeﬃcient for the average ownership share
per board member (MB SB FBM AV) is positive but less signiﬁcant than in the
base case. Nevertheless, we regard this result with caution because of the method-
ological issue involved: Since we are not able to obtain the number of all former
board members (nor do we think that this would be especially useful), the divisor
of the average insider ownership variable contains the share of all active and former
board members while the denominator does only reﬂect all active board members.
In model 10 we take a diﬀerent approach to account for the concentration of in-
sider ownership: Besides the cumulated shareholdings of insiders (MB SB FBM) we
include the number of those registered insider shareholders (MB SB FBM NO) as
an additional explanatory variable. The result is similar to those previously found
for the case of blockholders: While MB SB FBM is positive, MB SB FBM NO is
negative (both signiﬁcant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively) indicating that the
positive eﬀect declines, if the insider ownership share is spread across an increasing
number of insiders. Even though the results of model 10 appear as plausible as the
base case speciﬁcation of model 2 we will stick to the base case model 2 in the
next section because of the advantages associated with dealing with only one - and
not two - possible endogenous insider variables. Finally, in model 11 inside owner-
ship is measured in terms of the Euro-value instead in terms of the equity share.
The accordingly deﬁned variable (MB SB FBM EUR) turns out to be insigniﬁcant.
To summarize, it does not seem that any of the variations of the insider owner-
ship variable discussed before generates more reliable results than the simple insider
29We doubt the reliability of results including higher terms of insider ownership as indepen-
dent variables because of the arising multicollinearity. In our sample the VIFs for MB SB FBM
and MB SB FBM SQ reach 16.5 and 12.6 respectively indicating presence of multicollinearity.
We ﬁnd no procedure to deal with this problem in McConnell and Servaes (1990).
30It should be noted that we also included higher terms of MB SB FBM as done by Davies,
Hillier, and McColgan (2005) without obtaining more promising results than those found in
our base case model 2.
16ownership measure MB SB FBM used in the base case model 2 of the analysis.
4.4 Base case results in the pooled sample
Based on our conclusion that the insider ownership operationalizations of model
1 and 2, i.e. the simple individual insider ownership variables MB, SB and FBM
as well as the aggregated measure MB SB FBM, best catch the phenomenon of
insider ownership, table 12 summarizes the results of these equations for all three
performance measures as well as for the sub-sample 2003 (Panel A), sub-sample
1998 (Panel B) and the pooled sample (Panel C). For the sake of clarity only the
coeﬃcients of the insider ownership variables, their respective t-statistics and the
adjusted R2 are presented.
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As can be seen, the results for the 1998 sub-sample conﬁrm the results from the
2003 sub-sample. Moreover, for MTBV and ROA as performance measures, the
number of signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients is even larger than in the 2003 models.
Moreover, results become even more conclusive when using the pooled sample as in
Panel C; this may be an indication that the lack of signiﬁcance of some coeﬃcients
obtained in the two preceding sub-sample estimations may be due to the relatively
small sample size. In the pooled models (n=447-467), which also includes a year
dummy variable controlling for a potential ﬁxed time eﬀect, all insider ownership
coeﬃcients in the stock return model are positive and signiﬁcant on the 0.01 level.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcients of the aggregated insider ownership variable are pos-
itive and signiﬁcant at least on the 0.05 level for all three alternative performance
measures. None of the coeﬃcients turns out to be negative. To summarize, these
results corroborate the view that results are rather robust in the sense that they
point in the same direction regardless of the performance measure and the time pe-
riod under investigation. Hence, as far as the German capital market is concerned,
a positive relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance is likely
to exist.
4.5 The possible impact of endogeneity
In the OLS regression analysis insider ownership was implicitly assumed to be an
exogenous variable. Because of the objections raised by Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
and many others, which have been discussed in section 2, we follow the com-
mon approach to construct a simultaneous equation system in order to account for
the potentially reciprocal dependence of insider ownership and ﬁrm performance.31
Speciﬁcally, we estimate a simultaneous equation system treating insider owner-
ship and corporate value as endogenous variables using the two-stage least squares
(2SLS) method. Our systems consists of the following two equations:
31Similar simultaneous equation systems were used, among others, by Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996), Cho (1998) Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005), and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and
Zimmermann (2005) to address the potential endogeneity eﬀect.
17Corporate value = f(Insider ownership,firm characteristics) (1)
Insider ownership = g(Corporate value,firm characteristics) (2)
Equation (1), the corporate value equation, is the base case equation from
section 4.2. Hence, the OLS results for model 12 in table 13 are the known results
from our base case, i.e. model 2 in table 10. But treating insider ownership as
an endogenous variable, while we further assume the other control variables to be
exogenously determined, the 2SLS results in model 13 diﬀer from those of the OLS
regression.
Equation (2), the insider ownership equation, treats corporate performance,
measured by stock returns, as an endogenous variable. To meet the speciﬁcation
condition for simultaneous equation systems we exclude the dividend payment vari-
able (DIV) from equation (2), since we do not believe that insiders would choose
their share participation level according to expected dividend payments. In addition
to the other control variables from equation (1), we include four new variables which
we expect to have an impact on the level of insider ownership.
We expect insider ownership to be lower in companies with a large number of
management board members (MB NO) and in codetermined companies (CODET).32
In contrast, we believe that the existence of non-voting shares (VOTE), which facili-
tates the insiders to gain control rights in excess of their cash ﬂow rights, and a high
ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT ASSETS), a measure for discretionary
power of management, will favorably inﬂuence the extent of insider ownership. Since
it can be plausibly argued that insider ownership and corporate performance share
common determinants,33 we use the set of all exogenous variables from model 12
and 14 as instrumental variables for the endogenous variables in model 13 and 15.
The OLS- and 2SLS regression results for both equations are shown in table 13.
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As the insider ownership variable in model 13 still has a positive coeﬃcient
(signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level) while the corporate performance variable in model 15
is close to zero, we do not ﬁnd evidence for the hypothesis that the OLS results might
be strongly biased through the possible endogeneity of insider ownership.34 Thus,
our results conﬂict with the evidence presented by e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)
and Cho (1998), who show that a positive impact of insider ownership on corporate
value is a mere result of failing to control for endogeneity. In contrast, our ﬁndings
are roughly in line with those of Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005)
who also ﬁnd a positive impact of insider ownership on corporate performance, even
when they account for the possible endogeneity of insider ownership.
32German codetermination law requires that in companies of a certain size half of the
supervisory board members must be representatives of the employees. Since this narrows the
scope of managerial actions the managers might be restrained from owning larger stakes in
such types of companies. Cf. Gorton and Schmid (2000).
33Cf. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 379).
34As a corollary it should be noted that the results of equation 13 indicate that insider
ownership is more eﬀective in value creation than external blockholdings, as the ratio of both
coeﬃcients is equal to 1.6.
18As a ﬁnal piece of evidence against endogeneity in the insider ownership variable
the stickiness of this variable should be emphasized. For that purpose the question
is addressed to what extent current insider ownership is explained by former insider
ownership. More speciﬁcally, model 14 in table 13 is estimated once again as an
OLS-regression. This corresponds to model 16 in table 14. Thereafter, a lagged
insider ownership variable — measured as of the end of the year 1998 for the 2003
sub-sample and as of the end of the year 1993 for the 1998 sub-sample — is used
as an additional independent variable. As can be seen from the results of model 17
in table 14, this variable adds perceivable explanatory power to the regression and is
highly signiﬁcant. Hence, current insider ownership structure depends signiﬁcantly
on former insider ownership conﬁrming the view of the stickiness of this variable.
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To sum up, the results presented in this study corroborate the view that under
the German corporate governance environment insider ownership may, to some ex-
tent, be resistant to market mechanisms. This view is supported by the argument of
Edwards and Nibler (2000, p. 252) who justify their treatment of ownership concen-
tration as exogenous variable by the observation that “...the ownership structures
of many large German ﬁrms [...] do not change much over time”. Later, Edwards
and Weichenrieder (2004) test for endogeneity by dividing their sample in two parts,
one with and one without changes in ownership structure. They infer that because
the results for the two sub-samples are not diﬀerent on a signiﬁcant level, owner-
ship probably is not endogenous. Weighing all known arguments and evaluating the
empirical evidence, it may be plausible to treat insider ownership as an exogenous
variable, at least for Germany. Under this perspective this study provides interesting
evidence on the impact of insider ownership on ﬁrm performance.
4.6 Problems and Subjects of Further Research
It is well known that 2SLS-estimations are quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation of
the equation system. The theory for choosing instrumental variables is poor and
variations in the choice of instruments can signiﬁcantly eﬀect the results.35 This is a
severe problem of all empirical studies dealing with simultaneous equation systems.
As pointed out by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, p. 379) ‘instrumental
variables for managerial ownership are diﬃcult to ﬁnd. The basic problem is that
for any variable that plausibly determines the optimal level of managerial ownership,
it is also possible to argue that the same variable might plausibly aﬀect Tobin’s Q
[as a measure for corporate value].’ Hence, it was argued here that endogeneity is
not only a question of how the results of an ordinary OLS-equation compare to the
results of an appropriate 2SLS-estimation. It is also a question of economic and
empirical reasoning. Given that it could have been showed that insider ownership is
a rather inert variable, endogeneity may be perceived as less imminent than in the
US data. There, insider ownership is much more related to ﬁrm performance, as it
is to a large extent the result of compensation contracts. This is still very diﬀerent
from the German situation.
Of course, future research should still address the issue of endogeneity. One
way to do so is to extend the pooled cross-sectional data set to a low frequency
35Cf. Barnhart, Marr, and Rosenstein (1994) and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2004).
19unbalanced panel data set. This would allow to use lagged variables as more plau-
sible instruments and to increase the sample size in a pooled cross section analysis.
This procedure is also suggested by B¨ orsch-Supan and K¨ oke (2002), who provide
a comprehensive review of the problems involved in empirical corporate governance
studies.
5 Conclusion
This paper addressed the question whether there is any empirical relationship be-
tween corporate performance and insider ownership. Although agency theory pro-
vides some good reasons why such a relationship should exist, empirical evidence is
rather fuzzy in this regard. One reason is that most studies deal with Anglo-Saxon
countries, where it seems that results are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by an endogeneity
problem. This problem is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership
seems to be mainly driven by compensation contracts. Evidently, in such a case
ﬁrm performance and insider ownership are simultaneously determined.
This paper deals with the German capital market. This is important for the
following reasons. First, insider ownership in Germany is a widespread phenomenon
that is only partially inﬂuenced by the fact that ﬁrms grant stock based compen-
sation packages. In fact, insider ownership seems to be rather stable over time
in Germany. Second, it seems that there is much more cross-sectional variation
in the ownership structure in Germany as compared to the US. Starting from this
presumption the results in this paper make a contribution to the literature for the
following two reasons. First, if it is true that the relationship between ﬁrm perfor-
mance and insider ownership is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by endogeneity, the data
will allow to make an unbiased observation as to whether insider ownership aﬀects
ﬁrm performance. Second, this study is among the ﬁrst to give a comprehensive
overview on the ownership structure of German corporations. Using a data set of
648 ﬁrm years for the years 2003 and 1998 we ﬁnd robust evidence corroborating the
presumption that insider ownership has a positive impact on corporate performance.
This result holds regardless of the performance measure used, although evidence is
most supportive when using stock price performance as opposed to market-to-book
ratios or return on assets. Moreover, the sign and signiﬁcance of the relationship
does not change, even if we account for endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression
approach. Finally, we also ﬁnd outside block ownership as well as more concentrated
insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Overall the
results indicate that ownership structure might be an important variable explaining
the long term value creation in the corporate sector.
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23Table 1: Sample Selection 1998 - 2003
1998 2003
Number of share classes represented in the CDAX as of 31.12.YYYYa 520 719
Number of dual listings (i.e. more than one share class is listed) 60 38
Number of companies represented in the CDAX as of 31.12.YYYY 460 681
Number of ﬁnancial companies (i.e. investment companies, mortgage
banks, credit banks, insurance companies)
80 29
Number of non-ﬁnancial companies represented in the CDAX as of
31.12.YYYY
380 652
Number of non-ﬁnancial companies which are not represented in
the CDAX as of I) for 2003: 31.12.1998 and II) for 1998: neither
31.12.1993 nor 31.12.2003a
22 362
Total number of sample companies 358 290
The CDAX includes the shares of all domestic companies listed in Prime Standard and General
Standard. The index represents the German equity market in its entirety, i.e. all companies
listed on FWB Frankfurter Wertpapierb¨ orse (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) in the oﬃcial and
regulated market.
a This restriction was introduced as the sample is part of a larger research project aiming to
analyze changes in the ownership structures. Hence, companies must be listed in the CDAX
for at least one ﬁve year period.
24Table 2: Ownership Structure Classiﬁcation Scheme
Category (CODE) Description
Insider Ownership / Managerial Ownership
Management board
member (MB)




Active member of the supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) including fam-
ily members. Only stakes of individuals/families qualify for this cate-
gory. The stakes of corporations sending representatives to the supervi-
sory board are not incorporated.
Former board member
(FBM)
Former member of the management and supervisory board including fam-
ily members. Only stakes of individuals/families qualify for this category.
Outsider Block Ownership
Corporates Non-ﬁnancial company
Investment companies Investment companies (i.e. venture capital and buyout companies)
Banks Mortgage, credit or investment bank (for own account)
Institutionals Institutional Investors (asset management companies, pension funds,
banks (for third party account), etc.)
Insurance companies Insurance companies
Government German municipal, state and federal government
Outside Individuals Individual persons which are not insiders
Treasury Shares Shares hold by the company itself (limited to 10% in § 71 Abs. 2 AktG)
Employees Employees of the company excluding members of the boards
Others All shareholders which can not be assigned to another category
Outsider Dispersed Ownership
Freeﬂoat Freeﬂoat portion of the shares calculated as 100% less sum of the share-
holdings of all other categories
The scheme was developed for this speciﬁc research project and is characterized by the explicit consider-
ation of insider ownership. Other, more common classiﬁcation schemes only use the categories “private
households”, “individuals” or “families” without further distinguishing among diﬀerent types of individuals
(e.g. outsiders and insiders) and, hence, are not appropriate for our research purpose.
25Table 3: Deﬁnition of Variables
Code Description
BAHR Buy-and-hold stock returns, measured over the preceding 60 months (i.e., from
12/1998 to 12/2003 and 12/1993 to 12/1998).
MTBV Market-to-Book-Value (MTBV), measured as market value of equity (sum of all
share classes) divided by the book value of equity as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998.
ROA Return on assets (ROA) in percent, measured as (((PAT + INTEREST x (1-
TAX)) / TOTAL ASSETS)-1) x 100; with PAT = published after tax proﬁt,
INTEREST = total interest charges, TAX = tax rate, and TOTAL ASSETS =
average (year beginning/end) of total assets for the years 2003 and 1998.
MB Cumulated shareholdings (all voting and non-voting share classes) of all active
members of the management board (“Vorstand”) and their families in percent
(as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
SB Cumulated shareholdings of all active members of the supervisory board (“Auf-
sichtsrat”) and their families in percent (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
FBM Cumulated shareholdings of all former members of the management and super-
visory board and their families in percent (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
MB SB FBM The sum of MB, SB and FBM (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
MB SB FBM SQ The squared value of MB SB FBM (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM 0to25 Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988,
p. 298)). MB SB FBM is between 0 and 5 percent (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM 5to25 Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988,
p. 298)). MB SB FBM is between 5 and 25 percent (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM 25to100 Variable for piecewise-linear regression (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988,
p. 298)). MB SB FBM is higher than 25 percent (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM AV Average shareholdings per board member calculated as MB SB FBM divided by
the number of active members of both boards, including employees’ representa-
tives (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM NO Number of registered insider shareholders (as indicated in Hoppenstedt Ak-
tienf¨ uhrer) as a measure of concentration of insider ownership (as of 31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM EUR Euro-value of the MB SB FBM shareholdings calculated as MB SB FBM mul-
tiplied by the average of monthly market values of equity during 2003 (as of
31.12.2003).
MB SB FBM LAG Lagged value of MB SB FBM as of 31.12.1998 for the 2003 sub-sample and as
of 31.12.1993 for the 1998 sub-sample.
BLOCK O Cumulated shareholdings of all outside blockholders, who each hold a stake of at
least 5 percent (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
BLOCK NO Number of outside blockholders, who each hold a stake of at least 5 percent (as
of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
LN ASSETS Size of the company, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (as of
31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
FIRM RISK Firm speciﬁc risk, measured as the sum of squared residuals (SSE) from a regres-
sion of individual stock returns on market returns (CDAX) over the preceding 60
months (i.e., from 12/1998 to 12/2003 and 12/1993 to 12/1998).
DEBT RATIO Debt ratio, proxied as the ratio of book value of total debt divided by the sum
of book value of total debt and market value of equity (as of 31.12.2003 and
31.12.1998).
SALES G Annual sales growth, measured over the preceding 3 years (i.e., from 12/2000 to
12/2003 and 12/1995 to 12/1998).
DIV Dummy variable: 1, if the company paid dividends during the year and 0 otherwise
(2003 and 1998).
YEAR 1998 Dummy variable: 1, if the observation belongs to the 1998 sub-sample and 0
otherwise.
INDUSTRY DUMMIES 8 dummy variables (7 of them used in the regressions), based on a modiﬁed
industry classiﬁcation used for the CDAX in 1998.
MB NO Number of members of the management board (as of 31.12.2003 and
31.12.1998).
VOTE Level of voting restrictions; 0 if no non-voting preference shares are issued and
1 divided by the ratio of ordinary share capital to preference share capital if
non-voting preference shares are outstanding (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
CODET Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is subject to the codetermination
law (i.e. the half of the supervisory board members are representatives of the
employees) and 0 otherwise (as of 31.12.2003 and 31.12.1998).
INT ASSETS Ratio of total intangible assets divided by total assets (as of 31.12.2003 and
31.12.1998).
26Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A: 2003 (n=290)
BAHR 285 -7.140 -22.584 85.251 -99.873 424.392
MTBV 238 2.024 1.537 1.671 0.233 11.212
ROA 251 2.747 3.695 10.317 -50.880 40.002
MB 290 0.107 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.873
SB 290 0.099 0.000 0.218 0.000 0.990
FBM 290 0.085 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.990
MB SB FBM 290 0.290 0.211 0.307 0.000 0.990
BLOCK O 290 0.320 0.174 0.366 0.000 1.000
BLOCK NO 290 1.080 1.000 1.188 0.000 6.000
LN ASSETS 261 12.875 12.514 2.036 7.000 18.990
FIRM RISK 286 1.504 0.731 1.954 0.015 12.060
DEBT RATIO 253 0.318 0.280 0.269 0.000 0.939
SALES G 260 -0.009 -0.022 0.368 -1.000 5.138
DIV 258 0.600 1.000 0.491 0.000 1.000
MB NO 283 3.270 3.000 1.782 1.000 14.000
VOTE 290 0.119 0.000 0.292 0.000 1.000
CODET 285 0.320 0.000 0.466 0.000 1.000
INT ASSETS 259 0.089 0.050 0.104 0.000 0.518
Panel B: 1998 (n=358)
BAHR 240 23.184 3.316 84.529 -97.482 478.920
MTBV 319 3.054 2.257 2.340 0.482 14.809
ROA 281 5.449 4.854 9.097 -34.440 81.629
MB 358 0.141 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.988
SB 358 0.085 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.948
FBM 358 0.070 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.986
MB SB FBM 358 0.296 0.205 0.313 0.000 0.988
BLOCK O 358 0.326 0.150 0.374 0.000 1.000
BLOCK NO 358 0.910 1.000 1.043 0.000 6.000
LN ASSETS 349 12.560 12.274 1.900 8.540 18.720
FIRM RISK 244 0.536 0.356 0.624 0.005 4.740
DEBT RATIO 342 0.204 0.152 0.201 0.000 0.832
SALES G 327 0.169 0.065 0.566 -1.000 6.105
DIV 329 0.690 1.000 0.463 0.000 1.000
MB NO 354 3.250 3.000 1.894 1.000 17.000
VOTE 358 0.139 0.000 0.305 0.000 1.000
CODET 256 0.290 0.000 0.457 0.000 1.000
INT ASSETS 347 0.061 0.015 0.100 0.000 0.616
The deﬁnitions of all variables can be found in table 3.
27Table 5: Insider Ownership across Industries (2003)
Industry N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Automobile 19 0.241 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.774
Chemicals 28 0.258 0.275 0.268 0.000 0.810
Construction 29 0.284 0.027 0.315 0.000 0.873
Consumers 65 0.367 0.392 0.323 0.000 0.990
Electronics 49 0.280 0.245 0.246 0.000 0.990
Food & Beverages 13 0.592 0.654 0.319 0.000 0.948
Industrial 67 0.267 0.050 0.326 0.000 0.963
Utilities & Transportation 20 0.048 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.465
All Industries 290 0.290 0.211 0.307 0.000 0.990
Insider ownership is deﬁned as the total equity stake of incumbent and former board members including
their families. This corresponds to the variable MB SB FBM deﬁned in table 3; The industry classi-
ﬁcation diﬀers from the current scheme used by Deutsche B¨ orse AG which classiﬁes Prime Standard
companies into 18 diﬀerent industries, since the new classiﬁcation scheme diﬀers from the one in place
at the end of 1998. Furthermore, the number of industry categories was reduced by grouping from 15
to 8 non-ﬁnancial categories.
28Table 6: Ownership Structures - Cash Flow Rights in Percent (2003)
Mean Ownership Share
Ownership Group Unweighted Weighted by Market Value
of Equitya
Freeﬂoat 36.0 46.7
MB SB FBM 29.0 11.5
Corporates 19.4 15.2
Investment Companies 4.7 0.6
Banks 2.9 2.4
Institutionals 2.8 9.3
Insurance Companies 1.2 3.8
Government 1.2 6.3
Outsider Individuals 0.8 2.1




For the deﬁnition of the variables cf. tables 2 and 3.
a Average of monthly market values of equity during 2003.
Table 7: Insider Ownership Deciles (2003)
N Mean Market Value of Mean Freeﬂoat Portion
Equity (in EUR million) (in Percent)a
0% ≤ MB SB FBM < 10% 128 3.155 33.9
10% ≤ MB SB FBM < 20% 16 163 54.0
20% ≤ MB SB FBM < 30% 13 300 51.7
30% ≤ MB SB FBM < 40% 22 2.425 53.9
40% ≤ MB SB FBM < 50% 26 1.311 44.2
50% ≤ MB SB FBM < 60% 31 992 39.0
60% ≤ MB SB FBM < 70% 17 241 27.8
70% ≤ MB SB FBM < 80% 13 113 26.2
80% ≤ MB SB FBM < 90% 11 62 14.7
90% ≤ MB SB FBM < 100% 13 216 4.4
All Inside Ownership Deciles 290 1.859 36.0
For the deﬁnition of the variables cf. table 3.
a Unweighted cash ﬂow rights.
29Table 8: Diﬀerence in Means Tests (2003)
High Low
Full Sample MB SB FBM MB SB FBM t-statistics
(n=290) (n=145) (n=145)
MB SB FBM 0.290 0.559 0.017
BAHR -7.140 -12.097 -2.221 0.955
MTBV 2.024 2.030 2.018 -0.055
ROA 2.747 3.198 2.307 -0.684
BLOCK O 0.320 0.072 0.569 15.801 ***
BLOCK NO 1.080 0.550 1.610 8.497 ***
LN ASSETS 12.875 12.295 13.443 4.738 ***
FIRM RISK 1.504 1.667 1.344 -1.398
DEBT RATIO 0.318 0.336 0.301 -1.050
SALES G -0.009 0.022 -0.038 -1.318
DIV 0.6000 0.590 0.610 -0.355
MB NO 3.270 3.010 3.510 2.380 **
VOTE 0.119 0.148 0.089 -1.735 *
CODET 0.320 0.190 0.440 4.705 ***
INT ASSETS 0.089 0.090 0.088 -0.183
*, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance on the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (2-tailed; equal



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 11: OLS-Regression Results – II (2003)
Dependent Variable BAHR
Model No. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Intercept -99.631 -109.954 -149.507 -120.092 -73.145
(-1.488) (-1.547) (-1.900) * (-1.533) (-1.125)
MB SB FBM -77.025 101.220
(-1.104) (3.023) ***
MB SB FBM SQ 188.738
(2.056) **
MB SB FBM 0to5 -92.188
(-0.227)
MB SB FBM 5to25 -52.321
(0.502)
MB SB FBM 25to100 138.756
(2.707) ***
MB SB FBM AV 548.478
(2.359) **
MB SB FBM NO -17.013
(-2.135) **
MB SB FBM EUR -0,004
(-1.335)
BLOCK O 72.449 76.192 83.595 82.980 53.585
(2.981) *** (2.922) *** (3.346) *** (2.954) *** (2.893) ***
BLOCK NO -9.102 -8.817 -11.307 -9.267 -15.622
(-2.323) ** (-2.107) ** (-2.850) *** (-2.243) ** (-3.292) ***
LN ASSETS 7.849 8.312 11.224 8.805 7.705
(2.444) ** (2.485) ** (2.912) ** (2.482) ** (2.373) **
FIRM RISK 4.714 5.234 2.448 6.156 4.922
(0.515) (0.523) (0.285) (0.589) (0.413)
DEBT RATIO -80.980 -82.698 -84.098 -83.212 -79.858
(-4.556) *** (-4.596) *** (-4.803) *** (-4.407) *** (-3.853) ***
SALES G 27.965 26.560 27.635 25.790 29.212
(1,869) * (1.808) * (1.848) * (1.776) * (1,964) **
DIV 66.068 65.364 57.904 62.384 61.269
(4.169) *** (3.946) *** (4.206) *** (4.018) *** (3.537) ***
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 247 247 247 247 247
R2 0.427 0.417 0.413 0.413 0.372
R2 adj. 0.388 0.373 0.375 0.372 0.331
Heteroskedasticity robust White (1980) estimators are used. The deﬁnitions of all variables can be found in table 3.
*, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance on the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (2-tailed). Variations of the insider ownership
thresholds in equation 6 were performed. However, the results are not shown because none of these variations delivered
considerably better results than those by using the 5% and 25% thresholds originally used by Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988). In model 7 the VIFs for MB SB FBM and MB SB FBM SQ are 16.5 and 12.6 respectively indicating














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 13: Simultaneous Equation System – OLS- and 2SLS-Regression Re-
sults (Pooled Sample)
Dependent Variable BAHR MB SB FBM
Model No. (12) OLS (13) 2SLS (14) OLS (15) 2SLS
Intercept -138.029 -289.245 0.810 0.767
(-3.947) *** (-2.880) *** (8.346) *** (6.802) ***
MB SB FBM 75.747 239.348
(4.435) *** (2.395) **
BAHR 0.000a 0.000b
(3.899) *** (0.165)
BLOCK O 63.030 146.035 -0.526 -0.513
(4.570) *** (2.855) *** (-18.235) *** (-16.927) ***
BLOCK NO -3.858 4.427 -0.045 -0.048
(-1.059) (0.689) (-4.723) *** (-4.771) ***
LN ASSETS 10.947 16.367 -0.021 -0.015
(5.057) *** (3.978) *** (-2.564) ** (-1.293)
FIRM RISK 3.063 2.961 0.002 -0.000
(0.809) (0.708) (0.241) (0.043)
DEBT RATIO -75.739 -67.262 -0.017 0.047
(-5.147) *** (-3.952) *** (-0.404) (-0.758)
SALES G 31.356 32.913 -0.026 -0.011
(3.925) *** (3.721) *** (-1.189) (-0.412)
DIV 52.304 51.547
(6.441) *** (5.727) ***
YEAR 1998 4.583 7.412 -0.024 -0.022
(0.653) (0.936) (-1.245) (-1.109)





(-2.866) *** (-2.805) ***
INT ASSETS -0.230 -0.212
(-2.187) ** (-1.955) *
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 467 447 473 238
R2 0.376 0.323 0.663 0,634
R2 adj. 0.354 0.299 0.649 0,602
The deﬁnitions of all variables can be found in table 3. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance on the 0.10,
0.05 and 0.01 level (2-tailed).
a The exact value is 4.696 x 10−4.
b The exact value is 7.519 x 10−5.
36Table 14: Endogeneity of Insider Ownership – OLS-Regression Re-
sults (Pooled Sample)
Dependent Variable MB SB FBM
Model No. (16) OLS (17) OLS
Intercept 0.810 0.517
(8.508) *** (5.223) ***
BAHR 0.001 0.001
(3.712) *** (3.550) ***
MB SB FBM LAG 0.003
(7.068) ***
BLOCK O -0.526 -0.436
(-22.000) *** (-14.489) ***
BLOCK NO -0.045 -0.030
(-5.180) *** (-3.715) ***
LN ASSETS -0.021 -0.011
(-2.523) ** (-1.400)
FIRM RISK 0.002 0.002
(0.199) (0.110)
DEBT RATIO -0.017 -0.003
(-0.376) (-0.075)
SALES G -0.026 -0.028
(-1.157) (-1.408)
YEAR 1998 -0.024 -0.013
(-1.278) (-0.743)





(-3.049) *** (-2.694) ***
INT ASSETS -0.230 -0.220
(-2.016) ** (-2.132) **
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
n 473 456
R2 0.663 0.717
R2 adj. 0.649 0.704
Heteroskedasticity robust White (1980) estimators are used. The deﬁnitions of all variables
can be found in table 3. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance on the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level
(2-tailed).
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